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Abstract: Why Parmenides had a cosmology is a perennial puzzle, if, as the
‘truth’ part of his poem appears to claim, what exists is one, undifferentiated,
timeless and unchanging.1 Indeed, not only does the cosmological part of the
poem tell us how the cosmos is arranged, it also tells us how the cosmos, hu-
mans and animals all came into being. Although more of the truth has sur-
vived, the cosmology originally made up some 2/3 to 3/4 of the poem.2 The
poem claims it will give the ‘complete ordering’ and Parmenides is perceived to
have ‘completed all the phenomena’.3 Parmenides also seems to have made
some important original contributions to cosmology.4 These I take to be impor-
tant facts which any explanation of the nature of this cosmology must account
for. The aim of this paper is to explore a new suggestion for the status of the
cosmology, that it may be equalled but not surpassed by other cosmologies
which are capable of accounting for all of the phenomena. Its function, I argue,
is to raise sufficient reason issues about some fundamental questions in cos-
mogony and cosmology. I will also argue that we can find sufficient reason
considerations relating to cosmogony and cosmology in the truth part of the
poem. This opens the possibility that it is at least in part issues of sufficient
reason that link the two parts of the poem. Finally I will argue that by paying
close attention to what Parmenides has to say about signs, σήματα, we can see
how he leaves open the possibility of making positive contributions to cosmol-
ogy. I believe this gives us a richer account of Parmenides, places him more
firmly in the debates of presocratic cosmology and cosmogony and gives him
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1 I refer to the three parts of the poem as the proem, truth, and opinion or cosmological parts.
I avoid first, second etc. to avoid confusion as some count the truth section as the first part
while others count it as the second. My thanks to audiences at the annual London Ancient
Science conference, the International Association of Presocratic Studies conference in Merida
and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.
2 At least 2/3, D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984 p. 21,
J. Palmer Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 160,
80%.
3 Parmenides, Fr. 8, 60 and Plutarch, Reply to Colotes 1114b.
4 D. Graham (forthcoming) and D. Sedley, Parmenides and Melissus, pp. 113–133 in The Cam-
bridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, ed. A. A. Long, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999, p. 113.
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interesting relations to his predecessors and successors.5 These sufficient rea-
son considerations may work both as a critique of contemporary cosmogony
and cosmology and a challenge to any future cosmogony and cosmology.
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I
I am not convinced by any of the older extant attempts to explain the cosmol-
ogy. The view of Zeller and Burnet is that the cosmology is not Parmenides’, but
is a summary of some other contemporaries.6 It has never been satisfactorily
explained why Parmenides would expound someone else’s view at this point, it
is not clear whose cosmology this might be, and the ancients commentators all
took this to be Parmenides‘ own cosmology.7 A second view is akin to some old-
er interpretations of Plato’s views of the physical world, that the cosmology is
the best that can be managed by mortals. If we take ἐοικότα in fragment 8, 60
as ‘likely’ rather than ‘fitting’, and look to a supposedly similar usage by Plato
in the Timaeus, then perhaps the cosmology is the most likely account we can
have, the best account of the physical world possible.8 Apart from the philology
which indicates ‘fitting’ is the better reading, this does not explain how it is
possible for there to be a more likely cosmology within Parmenides’ scheme
nor, if this is possible, why this particular cosmology is more likely. A more
blunt view is that cosmology is futile for Parmenides and that the cosmology
given exemplifies mortal error by confusing or speaking of both existence and
non-existence. Earlier in the poem (Fr. 8, 1–10) mortals are accused of this er-
ror, but it is not clear if this error is made in the cosmology. The key issue for
this view must be why, if mortals make such a fundamental, immediate and
debilitating error, the cosmology is so long and so detailed.

5 I will argue that Parmenides relation to his predecessors and successors is more complex
than the outright rejection of ‘the broad tradition of Ionian and Italian cosmology’ suggested
by G.E.L. Owen Eleatic Questions. The Classical Quarterly, 1960, pp. 84–102, esp. p. 84–5.
6 J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. London: Black, 1930, p. 185.
7 This is so from Aristotle onwards.
8 On the issues here see J. Bryan, Likeness and Likelihood in the Presocratics and Plato, Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011.
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II
I want to begin with a close analysis of exactly how the cosmological part of
Parmenides’ poem is introduced. Parmenides marks the transition from the
truth to the opinions of mortals by having the goddess say:
τόν σοι ἐγὼ διάκοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα φατίζω,
ὡς οὐ μή ποτέ τίς σε βροτῶν γνώμη παρελάσσῃ.
To you this ordering, entire and fitting, I tell,
so that no thought of mortals will overtake you.
Parmenides, Fr. 8, 60–61.
Mourelatos has argued that the choice of diacosmos here is significant.9 Rather
than simply use cosmos, Parmenides uses a word which suggests an ordering
and hence a cosmogony and which suggests too a thorough ordering. LSJ give
“to divide and marshal, muster, array” for the cognate verb διακοσμέω with
usages drawn from Homer and Thucydides. In Thucydides, diacosmos means
‘battle-formation’. Mourelatos sees in this that ‘The cosmos of mortals is actually
a battlefield.’10
I have three points to add here. Firstly, I would emphasise that the notions
of division and differentiation implicit here are significant. One cannot have an
ordered cosmos of a single entity. A single army must divide itself into multiple
components parts and then array itself for battle. So too for there to be a cosmos
there must be a differentiation of parts. One cannot have an ordered cosmos
where all the parts are identical. An army divides itself into hoplites, cavalry,
command, etc.11 It is notable that Parmenides does not describe what he argues
for in the truth part of his poem as a cosmos. If it was Parmenides’ intention to
highlight the difference between the truth and the opinion parts of his poem,
diacosmos was a brilliant choice of word. Thought of in terms of cosmology, it
brings with it sense of change, multiplicity and differentiation which were flatly
disallowed in the truth part of the poem. Thought of in terms of cosmogony, if

9 A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides. New Haven and London, Yale University
Press, 1970, p. 230, see also A. P. D. Mourelatos The Route of Parmenides, Revised and Ex-
panded Edition Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2008. Here I disagree with Long (1960)
p. 105 who comments that ‘διάκοσμον may mean no more than κόσμος used in a technical
sense.’
10 Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 231.
11 One might object here that we begin with one army and end with one army. Actually, that
objection helps my argument. In the move from army on the march to army arrayed for battle,
there must be multiplicity as the army divides for battle then unity as they form again. This
gives us not only one into many, but a subsequent many into one.
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we are beginning from a single, undifferentiated whole there must be a process
of an initial change, of one into many and a differentiation of parts, again all
flatly disallowed by the truth part of the poem. What this ought to focus us on
is methodology and criteria for cosmogony and cosmology. How can this dia-
cosmos be, given what Parmenides has already said? Secondly, this is what Par-
menides has to say in Fragment 4:
λεῦσσε δ’ ὅμως ἀπεόντα νόωι παρεόντα βεβαίως·
οὐ γὰρ ἀποτμήξει τὸ ἐὸν τοῦ ἐόντος ἔχεσθαι
οὔτε σκιδνάμενον πάντηι πάντως κατὰ κόσμον
οὔτε συνιστάμενον.
Look at things which although absent, are firmly present to the mind.
For you will not cut off what is from holding fast to what is
it does not disperse itself in every way and everywhere according to order
nor does it set itself together.12
Parmenides, Fr. 4.
I would paraphrase lines 2–4 here like this:
2. What is is indivisible.
3. What is does not disperse in an ordered fashion.
4. What is is not an ordered collection of entities.
Line 2 I would compare with Fr. 8, 6 where what is is one and continuous (ἕν,
συνεχές) and Fr. 8, 25 where what is is continuous and holds together (τῶι
ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.).
Line 3 then tells us that what is cannot be dispersed. The primary meanings
of σκίδνημι are to spread, scatter or disperse and so it has a strong spatial sense
to it. What is cannot form a cosmos as there are not multiple entities to disperse
in an ordered fashion
Line 4 then tells us that what is is not set together, which I take to mean
what is cannot be multiple separate entities set together. The verb here, συνίστη-
μι primarily means to set together but can also mean arrange in order of battle. It
is frequently used in cosmological contexts for the setting together of the cosmos
or some ordered part of the cosmos.13 What is cannot be dispersed in good order
and form a cosmos and neither can it be put together in good order to form a
cosmos as it lacks the separate parts that can be ordered to make a cosmos.

12 Taking the verbs here as middles rather than passives (it is not dispersed… is not set to-
gether).
13 See e.g. Plato, Republic 530a, Timaeus 29e–32b and 92c, and there are also important uses
at 36d–37e, 48a, 53b and 69b. There are also interesting uses at Plato, Phaedrus 268d and
Politicus 308c. See also the use of συνίστημι in the Derveni Papyrus.
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Why does Parmenides say neither σκιδνάμενον nor συνιστάμενον? One inter-
esting possible contrast here is that Parmenides may wish to deny that what is
can be spatially dispersed and be a cosmos and also that even if what is is set
together, without gaps and forming a plenum, it still cannot form a cosmos.
Parmenides could here simply say ‘it cannot be dispersed’, without the com-
ment on order and ‘nor can it be put together’ without the cosmological and
indeed teleological associations of συνίστημι. As it stands this looks like an out-
right rejection of the idea that what is can be a cosmos on the grounds that
lacking parts it cannot have the necessary order.14 That stands in stark contrast
to the idea of diacosmos.
The third point I would add to this analysis of diacosmos Fr. 8, 60 is that a
few lines earlier, the goddess, when introducing the opinion section, says:
ἐν τῶι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα
ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης. δόξας δ΄ ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας
μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.
At this point I stop my trustworthy account of thought
and truth. From now on learn the opinions of mortals,
listening to the deceitful kosmos of my words.
Parmenides Fr. 8, 50–52.
I deliberately leave kosmos untranslated here as it is all too easy to render it as
‘world’, ‘form’ or ‘order’ and to lose the contrast with διάκοσμον just a few lines
further on. On the one hand we have a deceitful order of words, on the other we
have a thorough and entire ordering. Again, I suggest what this ought to focus us
on is methodology and criteria for cosmogony and cosmology. What are the differ-
ences between the deceitful cosmos of words and a thoroughly ordered cosmos?15
III
Returning to Parmenides Fr. 8, 60–61, παρελαύνω, the root verb for παρελάσσῃ
means to drive past or overtake, in sailing or running. Some commentators have

14 One might also look at Fr. 4 in terms of rarer and denser, when the target might be Anaxi-
menes.
15 I agree with P. Curd The Legacy of Parmenides. Las Vegas, Parmenides, 2004 p. xvii. that
Parmenides does not deny the possibility of genuine cosmology and, while I would disagree
with Curd on some of the specifics of how Parmenides does this, I agree that “His aim is to
criticize previous accounts of the nature of things while formulating metatheoretical require-
ments for an acceptable cosmological account.”
20  Andrew Gregory
Brought to you by | UCL - University College London
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/30/15 11:45 AM
taken this to imply that the account we are about to be given is in some sense
the best possible. This is unjustified on the philology. What the Greek actually
says is that no-one can overtake you. It is important to recognise the possibility
that accounts of the cosmos might equal this one without surpassing it.16 It is
notable that Parmenides does not rule out this possibility when he easily could
have done so and no other passage in the poem suggests that this is a better
account than any other. In particular, Fragment 1 might be thought to deny the
possibility of a better cosmology:
χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος17 ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.
It is right18 that you learn all things
both the unshaken heart of persuasive truth
and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true trust.
Parmenides Fr. 1, 28–30.
At Parmenides, Fr. 8, 60–61 we are promised the entire, fitting ordering (διά-
κοσμον ἐοικότα πάντα) and this is worth emphasising, as is the fact that the
Greek phrase, taken in this way, is quite emphatic in itself. Certainly Parme-
nides is perceived as having accounted for all the phenomena, by Plutarch,
who commented that Parmenides:
ὅς γε καὶ διάκοσμον
πεποίηται, καὶ στοιχεῖα μιγνύς, τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ σκοτεινόν,
ἐκ τούτων τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ.
καὶ γὰρ περὶ γῆς εἴρηκε πολλὰ καὶ περὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἡλίου
καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἄστρων καὶ γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων ἀφήγηται
Made an ordering,
and mixing the elements, the light and dark,
out of and through these he completed all of the phenomena
He has a great deal to say about the earth, the heavens, the sun

16 I do not see that the fact that the goddess gives the account and ‘has her authority’ means
that it is the best possible (contra Palmer (2009) p. 162.). It may still be equalled and at no
point is it made clear what, either in the account or in the nature of the account makes it better
than any other account, other than the claim to comprehensiveness which could be equalled.
17 Reading εὐπειθέος rather than εὐκυκλέος, see Mourelatos (1970, 2008) pp. 154–6, cf. J. Pal-
mer Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, 378ff., Gal-
lop (1984) 52, Curd (2004) 21 note 53.
18 Agreeing with Mourelatos (1970, 2008) 277 ff. that χρή and its cognates should be translated
with a sense of ‘ought’ or ‘right’ or ‘proper’ rather than necessity in the sense of constraint or
compulsion.
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and the moon and he tells of the generation of humans.
Plutarch, Reply to Colotes 1114b.
Here I emphasise τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ, that all of the
phenomena have been completed. By modern standards of course this looks
wildly optimistic, but it is reasonable in the context of presocratic cosmology
and cosmogony, where the significant issues could be dealt with in a few hun-
dred lines.19 Parmenides both claims to make and is perceived to have made a
complete account of the phenomena.
Finally in relation to Parmenides, Fr. 8, 60–61 I translate ἐοικότα as fitting
rather than as ‘likely’ or ‘probable’ in line with modern philology which finds
attested usage for ‘fitting’ prior to Parmenides but not for ‘likely’ or ‘probable’.20
I take ἐοικότα as an adjective modifying διάκοσμον and not an adverb modify-
ing φατίζω.21 There are two more related points here. Firstly, recent Timaeus
scholarship has looked closely at the issue of the eikos muthos and has argued
for a reading of ‘appropriate, reasonable, rational’ in Plato rather than ‘likely’
or ‘probable’.22 Secondly, it is difficult to see how the notion of a likely or prob-
able account helps given what Parmenides says about mortal opinion at Fr. 1,
28–30 and Fr. 8, 50–52. It is unclear how it would be possible for there to be a
more likely cosmology within Parmenides’ scheme or, if this is possible, why
the particular cosmology that Parmenides gives would count as more likely.
IV
My proposal concerning the nature of Parmenides’ cosmology is based on this
construal of παρελαύνω and the claim that the cosmology is complete. If the
cosmology is complete, then no other theory will be able to surpass it on the
grounds of accounting for more of the phenomena, though some may well

19 See G. Cerri, The Astronomical Section of Parmenides’ Poem, pp. 81–93, in N. L. Cordero,
Parmenides, Venerable and Awesome, 2011, pp. 82–3.
20 See e.g. W. J. Verdenius, Parmenides: Some Comments on His Poem. Groningen: Walters,
1942, pp. 50–51 and R. Cherubin, Light, Night, and the Opinions of Mortals: Parmenides
B8.51–61 and B9, Ancient Philosophy 25, 2005, 1–23, pp. 9–10 and Bryan (2011).
21 Cf. Cherubin (2005) 10, note 20. So a ‘fitting ordering’ rather than ‘I tell you an ordering as
is fitting’.
22 M. F. Burnyeat, Eikos Muthos. Rhizai A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, 2005
143–165, pp. 146–147, cf. G. Betegh, What Makes a Myth Eikos? pp.213–224 in R. D. Mohr and
B. M. Sattler, One Book, The Whole Universe. Las Vegas, Parmenides 2010 and A. P. D. Mourela-
tos The Epistemological Section (29b–d) of the Proem in Timaeus’ Speech, pp. 225–248 in Mohr
and Sattler (2010), cf. Bryan (2011).
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equal it. In modern terms, the theories accounting for all the phenomena will
be underdetermined by the data. Put another way, on the grounds of account-
ing for the phenomena, there will be no sufficient reason for choosing one of
these theories in front of another.23 Why would Parmenides want a theory which
can be equalled but not surpassed though? That depends on whether we take
the cosmology as Parmenides’ doctrine, or something more akin to an argu-
ment. The point of the light/night cosmology may be to generate a critique of
current cosmology and to pose general problems for thinking about cosmology,
if it generates this underdetermination. Part of the motivation here might lie in
Sedley’s comment about the cosmological tradition prior to Parmenides, that
they ‘produced too many competing answers to inspire confidence’.24 If we want
a cosmology, there are crucial choices to be made and we need to provide suffi-
cient reason for those choices. If there are multiple theories which cover the
data, then we need some further criteria concerning the nature of theories be-
fore we can make a choice between them.25 It is worth paying attention to the
order of what is introduced in the opinion section at Fr. 8, 53 ff.
μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας ὀνομάζειν·
τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἐστιν – ἐν ὧι πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν –
τἀντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας καὶ σήματ’ ἔθεντο
χωρὶς ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων, τῆι μὲν φλογὸς αἰθέριον πῦρ,
ἤπιον ὄν, μέγ’ ἐλαφρόν, ἑωυτῶι πάντοσε τωὐτόν,
τῶι δ’ ἑτέρωι μὴ τωὐτόν· ἀτὰρ κἀκεῖνο κατ’ αὐτό
τἀντία νύκτ’ ἀδαῆ, πυκινὸν δέμας ἐμβριθές τε.
Forms, then, they laid down two notions to name.26
Of which they ought not name one27 – in this they have gone astray –

23 So this is a straightforward underdetermination (many theories can be devised to cover the
data) rather than the more complex Duhem-Quine underdetermination thesis. This underdeter-
mination affects qualitative theories (many of those for the data) rather than the mathematical
formulation where many curves can always be found to fit any numerical data set out in gra-
phical fashion.
24 Sedley (1999), p. 131.
25 A note in relation to Palmer’s (2009) modal reading of Parmenides (the truth part of the
poem deals with ‘what must be’ the second with ‘entities that are but need not be’. There is a
sense in which what must be is determined, while what might be may well be underdeter-
mined.
26 This preserves the word order of the Greek as far as possible, cf. Mourelatos (1970, 2008)
228. See below for the ‘two minds’ view.
27 Here I retain the ambiguity in the Greek (how many is it necessary to name or not to name?)
which I strongly suspect is deliberate on Parmenides’ part. There is no ‘only’ in the Greek
which appears in some translations, e.g. A. H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Assen:
Van Gorcum, 1986.
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and distinguished them as opposite in form and set up signs
apart from each other, on the one hand the aetherial flame of fire,
being gentle and very light, in every way identical to itself
but not identical to the other. This in itself
is opposite, dark night, dense in body and heavy.
Parmenides Fr. 8, 53–59.
First mortals lay down (κατέθεντο) two forms, then they distinguish them as
opposites, which at this stage are non-specific, then they set up ‘signs’ (σήματ’),
characterising the opposites as light and dark. Fr. 8, 60–61, which is the end of
Fr. 8 then follows promising a complete, fitting and thorough ordering. So sche-
matically, the procedure goes:
1) Set up a non-specific pair of contraries, x and the contrary of x.
2) Distinguish them as ‘opposite in form’.
3) Set up ‘signs’ and attribute characteristics
4) Reproduce all the phenomena.
It is very noticeable that after the tightly argued truth, the basic principles of
the cosmology are introduced without any argument whatsoever, especially as
this is an area where there is already considerable controversy between cosmol-
ogists prior to Parmenides.28 There are four considerations we might raise here:
1) What reason is there for choosing two forms for naming as opposed to any
other number? Especially if mortals have in some way gone astray in doing
this?
2) What reason is there for choosing light and dark as opposed to any other pair
of contraries as the primary opposites?29
3) What reason is there for the proposed distribution of qualities, or indeed any
distribution of qualities? One might imagine a poet saying ‘dark night, dense
in body and heavy’ as their poetic description of what night feels like, but is
that a sound philosophical attribution?
4) What reason is there for the choice of the signs which mortals set up? There
is an important contrast here in relation to signs. Earlier, we are told that:
μόνος δ’ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτηι δ’ ἐπὶ σήματ’ ἔασι

28 This is not to say that there are no arguments in the opinion section, just that the key
principles when this section begins are not argued for, in stark contrast with what has gone
before and, one might add, the goddesses order to ‘judge by reason’ of Fr. 7.
29 One might argue that light and dark encompass all of the opposites, as all the pairs such as
hot and cold line up with light and dark, but why choose out of the arranged pairs light and
dark as the primary description?
24  Andrew Gregory
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πολλὰ μάλ’, ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
οὖλον μουνογενές30 καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδὲ τέλειον·
A single account of the road
remains, that it is. On this there are signs,
very many of them, that what is is ungenerated and imperishable
a whole of a single kind, both unshaking and complete.
Parmenides Fr. 8, 1–4
LSJ give sign, mark, token for σῆμα so in the context of the road metaphor here
sign or signpost seems reasonable.31 These signs though are there, objective, in-
dependent markers to be discovered as the road is followed. At the beginning of
the opinion section, on the other hand, mortals ‘set up signs’ (σήματ’ ἔθεντο) –
but do mortals have sufficient reason to choose and set up these signs? Do these
signs then guide us? There is an interesting sense in which that may be true. If
we set up our cosmological theory in terms of a pair of primary opposites, that in
a sense guides the rest of our cosmology. Where we have a new phenomenon to
explain, we look to do so in terms of the opposites we have already laid down.
Where we have competing theories to explain a phenomenon, we might decide
between them on grounds of coherence. Which of the competing theories better
coheres with our primary pair, or the consequences we have established from
our primary pair? Scanning the literature, nothing appears to have been written
on this contrast between the independent signs on the intellectual road and the
signs that humans set up but this seems critical in understanding Parmenides.
Mourelatos has argued that Fr. 8, 53, μορφὰς γὰρ κατέθεντο δύο γνώμας
ὀνομάζειν, has a secondary sense of those laying down the forms being in two
minds.32 If that is correct, and I am inclined to think it is, the underdetermina-
tion/sufficient reason issues allow us to understand why they were in two
minds. This sentence would then be in a highly significant position, indicating
the mental state of mortals when faced with the underdetermination issues in-
troduced in the next few lines.33
I take a major deception that the goddess speaks of to be that mortals ap-
pear to have made proper judgements in selecting opposites and selecting their

30 Reading οὖλον μουνογενές rather than ἐστι γὰρ οὐλομελές, see Curd (2004) 68 ff. and
agreeing that μουνογενές means ‘of a single kind’, see Curd (2004) 71, cf. Palmer (2009) 382 ff.,
Gallop (1984) 64.
31 Cf. Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 25 note 40.
32 Mourelatos (1970, 2008) 229 ff. As Mourelatos argues, the sentence is ambiguous and an
unambiguous reformulation of the sentence, still fitting Parmenides’ hexameter, was easily
available.
33 One might also note the goddesses injunction to ‘judge by reason’ at Fr. 7, 5 and the impos-
sibility of doing so here.
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qualities, when in fact they have not. They have chosen where the choice is
underdetermined, in sharp distinction to the truth part of the poem. If we are
aware of this happening with the light/dark cosmology, we will know how to
undermine any other account by asking sufficient reason questions about the
basis of their cosmology. Those accounts will not be able to surpass the light/
dark cosmology, either in terms of a defence of their basic suppositions or their
ability to account for the phenomena if the subsequent ordering given for the
light/dark cosmology is complete as is claimed.
This then is why the opinion section is so long. It needs to have an account
of all the phenomena usually accounted for in early Greek cosmologies in order
to generate the underdetermination. The light/dark cosmology is not intrinsi-
cally better than all of its competitors, with some able to equal it, generating
this underdetermination.
V
Parmenides’ cosmology asks questions about theory choice. I also want to sug-
gest that it functions as a critique of some preceding views and as a challenge
to Parmenides’ successors.
Let us look at the notion of critique first. Consider Fr. 8, 53–59 in relation
to the Pythagoreans who use contrary pairs such as right and left, male and
female, etc. Here are the Pythagorean opposites:34
finite infinite
odd even
one many
right left
rest motion
straight crooked
light darkness
good evil
square oblong
male female

34 From Aristotle, Metaphysics 986a22. This degree of codification of the Pythagorean oppo-
sites may well have been later than Parmenides, but the table nevertheless illustrates the types
of opposites and their arrangements that the earlier Pythagoreans would have been interested
in (see the Aristotle on Alkmaeon passage below) even if they might not have been arranged in
this exact manner.
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What sufficient reason is there to pick this set of opposites, when there are
many other possibilities and many other combinations? Was there a debate
about this sort of issue? According to Aristotle, there was and he compares the
looser approach of Alkmaeon with the more precise approach of the Pythagor-
eans:
Other members of this same school say there are ten principles, which they
arrange in two columns of cognates-limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and
plurality, right and left, male and female, resting and moving, straight and
curved, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong. In this way Al-
kmaeon of Croton seems also to have conceived the matter, and either he got
this view from them or they got it from him; for he expressed himself similarly
to them. For he says most human affairs go in pairs, meaning not definite con-
trarieties such as the Pythagoreans speak of, but any chance contrarieties, e.g.
white and black, sweet and bitter, good and bad, great and small. He threw out
indefinite suggestions about the other contrarieties, but the Pythagoreans de-
clared both how many and which their contrarieties are.35
Parmenides I suggest took a more radical view than Aristotle here. It is not
enough that the opposites are definite and that there is a strong sense of how
many of them there are. There must be sufficient reason to support these
choices. On this I disagree with Guthrie,36 who sees Parmenides as intending a
‘rationalization of existing beliefs’. Parmenides comes to undermine existing be-
liefs here, or at least to ask for a justification of them. Guthrie does raise an
interesting point in arguing that Parmenides grouped together pairs of opposites
in the following manner:
Active Passive
Fire Night
Bright Dark
Sky Earth
Hot Cold
Dry Moist
Rare Dense
Light Heavy
Right Left
Male Female
Soft Hard

35 Aristotle, Metaphysics I/5, translation by Ross.
36 W. K. C. Guthrie, The Presocratic Tradition from Parmenides to Democritus. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press 1965, pp. 77 ff.
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Guthrie recognises this table as conjectural,37 but it is the general principles
rather than the details which are significant here. It is possible to look at the
strength of the association for the columns in tables opposites in several ways. It
may be very strong, in the sense that square is good and oblong evil. There may
be some principle which characterises the members of each column, as active
and passive do in Guthrie’s table of Parmenides’ opposites. They may simply be
associated together with no specific principle in view.38 This raises a further suf-
ficient reason question though. There are not only issues about how many and
which combination of opposites should make up the table, but why they are
associated in these grouping, however strong we take that association to be.39
We can look at a second theme here as well, which is a possible critique of
the Milesians. Anaximander posits the apeiron, the unlimited, from which come
pairs of opposites such as hot and cold.40 Does he give sufficient reason though
why we get specific pairs of opposites rather than any other choice? Later in this
paper I will argue that Parmenides has another critique of Anaximander, which is
whether there is sufficient reason for when and where this separation occurs. We
might also question whether Anaximenes has sufficient reason to postulate dense
and rare as the primary opposition, or why the dense should be associated with
cold and the rare with hot.41 Focused slightly differently, how do we choose be-
tween water (Thales), unlimited (Anaximander) air (Anaximenes) or fire (Heracli-
tus) or light/dark if all of these make a claim to account for all of the phenomena?
Cosmologies pre-Parmenides could not justify their choice of opposites or of
cosmological principle constituents on the grounds that they alone could ac-
count for the phenomena. Depending on how radically we want to take this,
either Parmenides shows that the phenomena can be reproduced by the alterna-
tive pair of light and dark, or he shows that this can be done with an arbitrary
choice of opposites, and an arbitrary choice of qualities to characterise those
opposites. Parmenides may give us light and night as an example of how the
phenomena can easily be produced along these lines, or he may be saying ‘even
with principles as nebulous and ill defined as light and night one can still pro-
duce the phenomena’. So Parmenides cosmology is a critique of preceding cos-

37 Guthrie (1965) vol. II, p. 77 and see p. 77 note 1 for his justification.
38 I make no comment here on the proper interpretation of the Pythagorean table.
39 If questioning such attributions is a theme in Parmenides, we might want to rethink
whether Fr. 17 gives us doctrine or not: “δεξιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κούρας” (“Young
boys on the right, young girls on the left”). This is usually taken, with Galen (this is Galen. in
Epid. VI 48) to be Parmenides’ account of which side of the womb the sexes take, but we might
take this as another sufficient reason challenge – what reason is there for this distribution?
40 See e.g. Pseudo-Plutarch, Stromateis 2, Aetius Placita II, 11, 5.
41 See Plutarch VII, 947 f., Hippolytus Refutatio 1, 7, 1, Simpicius Physics 24, 26.
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mology on sufficient reason grounds. It also stands as a challenge to any future
cosmology. Can sufficient reason be given for a choice of cosmological theory?
VI
If we do construe the cosmology in this way, as generating sufficient reason
issues, does that open up some new possibilities for linking the truth and opi-
nion parts of the poem together? I believe it does and this will lead to some
further consideration concerning cosmogony, cosmology and sufficient reason.
Fr. 8, 5–10 is important here:
οὐδέ ποτ’ ἦν οὐδ’ ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἐστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,
ἕν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ;
πῆι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ’ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω
φάσθαι σ’ οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν
ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ’ ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν
ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν.
It never was nor will be, as it is now, all alike,
one and continuous. What birth will you seek for it?
In what way, from what source did it grow? I will not allow you
to think or say from not being, for it is not to be thought or said
that it is not; and what warrant might have driven it
later rather than sooner, beginning from nothing, to grow?
Parmenides Fr. 8, 5–10.
The last part here has indeed been taken as a sufficient reason argument and
while it is in the context of change in general, it has also been taken to be about
cosmogony and that in some ways is the most radical case here.42 If there is
nothing at all why would a cosmos begin to form? Why should cosmogony be-
gin at any one time as opposed to any other time? One way of linking this into
the truth of the poem is to look at Fr. 19, traditionally taken as closing both the
opinion section and the poem:
οὕτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε καί νυνκαὶ νῦν ἔασι43
καὶ μετέπειτ’ ἀπὸ τοῦδε τελευτήσουσι τραφέντα·
τοῖς δ’ ὄνομ’ ἄνθρωποι κατέθεντ’ ἐπίσημον ἑκάστωι.

42 Translating χρέος here as warrant rather than necessity (see Mourelatos (2008) xxviii and
xxxii note 28).
43 Printing καὶ νῦν ἔασι instead of καί νυν ἔασι which helps to bring out the past/present/
future temporal sense of the passage here, cf. Thomas Calvo, Truth and Doxa in Parmenides,
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Volume 59, Issue 3, 1977, pp. 245–260.
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Thus according to opinion these things have grown and now are
and afterwards, from this point, they will grow and come to an end.
For them men have laid down names to mark each.
Parmenides Fr. 19.44
That focuses us quite strongly back on Fr. 8, 5–10. There is the same issue of
growth and there is an allusion to the timeless nature of what is. It should also
focus us back onto Fr. 8 53–55 where mortals laid down names and signs, here
ἐπίσημον. Another way of linking Fr. 8, 5–10 into the opinion section of the
poem is through Fr. 10:
εἴσηι δ’ αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ’ ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα
σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο
λαμπάδος ἔργ’ ἀίδηλα καὶ ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,
ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσηι περίφοιτα σελήνης
καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα
ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη
πείρατ’ ἔχειν ἄστρων.
You will know the nature of the aether and all
of the signs in the aether and the clean, pure lamp of the sun,
its destructive deeds and the manner of their generation.
You will learn the works and nature of the wandering round-eyed moon
you will know the surrounding heaven
whence it grew and how necessity led and bound it
to hold the limits of the stars.
Parmenides, Fr. 10.
Here there is generation (ἐξεγένοντο) in contravention of Fr. 8, 2–3 and in particu-
lar the heavens grew in contravention of in Fr. 8, 10 (ἔφυ, same verb as the highly
emphaticφῦν in Fr. 8, 10). Finally, Fr. 11 is also very interesting in this respect:
πῶς γαῖα καὶ ἥλιος ἠδὲ σελήνη
αἰθήρ τε ξυνὸς γάλα τ’ οὐράνιον καὶ ὄλυμπος
ἔσχατος ἠδ’ ἄστρων θερμὸν μένος ὡρμήθησαν
γίγνεσθαι.
How earth, sun, moon,
common aether, heavenly milky way, Olympus
furthest away and the hot might of the stars began to
come to be.
Parmenides Fr. 11.
I have translated ὡρμήθησαν γίγνεσθαι here in an understated way as ‘began to
come to be’. That on its own is contrary to the strictures of the truth part of the

44 Simplicius, De Caelo Commentary, 558, 8.
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poem and Fr. 8, 5–10, but one might also look at some of the shades of mean-
ing for ὡρμήθησαν and ὦρσεν at Fr. 8, 9. Rush, thrust,45 strove,46 and hasten
are all possibilities for ὡρμήθησαν here and may sharpen the contrast with Fr. 8
5–10 depending on exactly how we take ὦρσεν there. There can be no doubt
that Parmenides took Fr. 8, 5–10 to have cosmological and cosmogonical signif-
icance and that the opinion part of the poem frequently reminds us of that.
VII
There is another sufficient reason issue in the truth part of the poem which
leads to some interesting issues in cosmogony and cosmology. A good deal of
the truth can be generated out of considerations concerning the nature of exis-
tence and non-existence. That what exists is homogenous might be a sufficient
reason issue (no reason for inhomogeneities to be here than elsewhere) but can
be generated simply by denying any existence to non-existence. Reality cannot
be like a Swiss cheese, because the holes, according to Parmenides, cannot ex-
ist. However, we are also told that:
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί,47
πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι,
μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον
οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι.
As there is an ultimate limit,48 it is complete,
from all sides like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,49
equivalent in all ways from the centre. For it must not be any larger
or any smaller here or there.
Parmenides, Fr. 8, 42–45.
There has been considerable debate on whether Parmenides argued that what is
is physically spherical. I am going to argue for the literal view. I do not think
this was an error or an oversight on Parmenides’ part. I believe his view to be
coherent, consistent and philosophically interesting. I also believe his view sets
up an interesting sufficient reason critique and challenge for cosmogony. I will

45 Gallop (1984) p. 81.
46 Cerri (2011) pp. 85–6.
47 Punctuating ‘τετελεσμένον ἐστί, πάντοθεν’ rather than ‘τετελεσμένον ἐστί πάντοθεν,’. See
Gallop (1984) 72, Mourelatos (1970, 2008) 123, Curd (2004) 92.
48 ‘Ultimate limit’ rather than ‘furthest limit’ for πεῖρας πύματον, see below.
49 ‘In all ways’ rather than ‘from all sides’ for πάντοθεν, see below.
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be careful here to refer to a ‘spherical entity’ and not a ‘spherical cosmos’. The
entity here I believe is meant to be spherical, but lacks the parts and the differ-
entiation, ordering and distribution of parts required for it to count as a cos-
mos.50
Against the literal interpretation, it is argued that Parmenides does not say
what is is a well rounded sphere, but it is like, ἐναλίγκιον, the bulk of a well
rounded sphere. The description should be treated as a metaphor or analogy.51
We are then free to explore in which ways what is may be like a sphere without
actually being physically spherical. Owen has argued that just as there is in
invariance of time in Parmenides, the analogy of the sphere brings out the in-
variance of space.52 Mourelatos has argued that a key aspect of a sphere is its
perfect symmetry, such that a sphere appears spherical whichever aspect it is
viewed from,53 and that the description of the sphere fits well with the idea of
the complete nature of being that Parmenides is arguing for.54
In favour of the literal interpretation, Jameson has argued that σφαῖρα
should be taken in the sense of ball, 55 rather than in the more abstract sense of
sphere and that ὄγκωι, bulk, also lends a physical sense.56 If we take πάντοθεν
to mean ‘from all quarters, from every side’ this could have either literal or me-
taphorical meanings. However, πάντοθεν can also mean ‘in every way’ which
would lean strongly to a literal reading. While I tend to agree with Gallop that
we cannot conclude from the fact that Parmenides employed the sphere analogy
whether he meant it literally,57 it would also seem relativley straightforward, if

50 As noted earlier, Parmenides does not refer to what he argues for in the truth part of the
poem as a cosmos, Fr. 4 explicitly denies it is a cosmos and the contrasts introduced at Fr. 8,
60–61 would seem to deny it is a cosmos as well.
51 Curd (2004) p. 92 and p. 93, Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 124 rejects ‘simile’ as too weak,
though he rejects the literal interpretation in favour of ‘speculative metaphor’, see his p. 124
and Ch. 1.
52 Owen (1960), p. 66.
53 Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 129.
54 Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 124.
55 G. Jameson, Well Rounded Truth and Circular Thought in Parmenides. Phronesis 1958,
pp. 15–30, p. 15 note 3, see Homer Odyssey VI, 100, 115, it is what Nausicaa and her maidens
play with, One would have to be cautious though to specify an homogenous ball, rather than
ball in the sense of football where the surround is distinct from its contents.
56 I would add to this that Plato uses σφαῖρα to describe a physically spherical earth in the
Phaedo 110b6–7 (ὥσπερ αἱ δωδεκάσκυτοι σφαῖραι) and that Anaximander may well have used
this term to decribe the carriers of the heavenly bodies (Ἀναξίμανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων καὶ τῶν
σφαιρῶν, ἐφ’ ὧν ἕκαστος βέβηκε, φέρεσθαι, Aetius, Placita, II, 16, 5.), where again the meaning
is clearly physical.
57 Gallop (1984) p. 20.
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Parmenides had wished to do so, to exclude spatial considerations here. Cer-
tainly many in antiquity took him to be arguing for a spherical entity.
There is another passage though, shortly before the sphere analogy, which
might incline us towards a literal reading:
ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται.
χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη
πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει.58
Remaining the same and in the same, it lies according to itself
thus it remains firmly in place. For strong necessity
holds it in the bonds of a limit, which shut it in all around.
Parmenides Fr. 8, 29–30.
αὖθι here looks strongly spatial. LSJ give on the spot, here, there, as primary
meanings.59 If this is meant to express the idea that what is undergoes no quali-
tative changes, without implying that what is has a place and stays there, it is
very clumsily and ambiguously expressed. If Parmenides were only talking
about change in general here, then all he would need to say would be ‘Remain-
ing the same, strong necessity holds it in the bonds of a limit, which shut it in
all around.’ He does not though, and adds in the strongly spatial ‘in the same’
as well as αὖθι. Parmenides also uses ἀκίνητον at Fr. 8, 26 and 38, for which
LSJ give ‘unmoved, motionless’. ἀκίνητον clearly means more in this context,
covering many sorts of changes, but it would have to retain its primary meaning
as well. Furthermore, at Fr. 8, 41, Parmenides specifically talks of τόπον ἀλλάσ-
σειν, change of place.60
This passage does two things. Firstly, it establishes a context of considera-
tions of place/space in which the comparison to a sphere is made. One might
add to that Fr. 8, 25:
τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει.
Thus it is all continuous. For what is draws near to what is.
Parmenides Fr. 8, 25.61

58 I stay with the orthodox text here rather than Fränkel’s proposed changes, see Fränkel
(1975) p. 30.
59 Homer’s usage is strongly spatial as well, see Odyssey V, 208.
60 Cf. Sedley (1999) 119 ff. that a spatial reading is required to give substance to Parmenides’
arguments about change. Parmenides is of course critical of change of place but one might
argue the criticism is of change, not of place.
61 Jameson (1958) p. 15 note 3 cites Parmenides Fr. 8, 22–25 as evidence that Parmenides is
‘conscious of reality as an extended thing’. Fr. 8, 22–24 seem to me reasonably easy to construe
as solely about the metaphysical properties of reality, Fr. 8, 25 much less so. See also Fr. 8, 6
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The primary sense of ξυνεχὲς in LSJ is ‘spatially continuous’ and πελάζει in this
context could easily be translated as ‘touches’.62 Secondly, if what is has a
place, and is spatially continuous as well, it will then be very difficult to deny
that what is is spatial and has some determinate shape, if it is complete.63 The
question then is; which shape?
The major problem for the literal view is that it is said to generate para-
doxes. These are allegedly easy to generate, impossible to solve and a philoso-
pher of the status of Parmenides would not have fallen into them.64 One, invol-
ving limits, can be expressed like this: “Must there not be empty space beyond
the limits of the sphere if they are to function as limits?”65 If we take limit here
in the sense of edge, that may be true, but there are other ways of thinking
about limits such that they are neither edges nor external to what is limited.
Here it is important to understand Fr. 8, 42 in a broad sense. ‘αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας
πύματον’ might be translated as ‘since there is a furthest limit’, giving it a
strong spatial sense. However, Parmenides seems to be discussing what is and
the complete nature of what is quite generally at this stage, so it may be better
to understand this as ‘since there is an ultimate limit’ in a more metaphysical
sense.66
Can a cosmos have limits that are not edges? The modern view here is that
what limits the size of the universe is the amount of time it has been in exis-
tence and its rate of expansion. Nothing limits the universe externally and there
are no edges to the universe. There is neither time nor space outside of the uni-
verse as these are both generated by the big bang. If we want some ancient

ἕν, συνεχές (one, spatially continuous) for further indications that Parmenides has something
extended in mind.
62 E.g. Gallop (1984) p. 69.
63 Something that has place technically need not have shape (a point has place but does not
occupy space and has no shape) but Parmenides can hardly be arguing that what is has the
characteristics of a point.
64 See e.g. M. C. Stokes, One and many in Presocratic Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1971, p. 140.
65 G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, M. Schofield The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd edition, 1983, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press (KRS) p. 254.
66 See e.g. Gallop (1984) p. 20. Parmenides closes this part if the discussion by saying (Fr. 8,
49): “οἷ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει”, “For being in all directions equal, it falls
homogenously within its limits.” Again, I take limit here in the more general sense rather than
as edge and the emphasis to be on the homogeneity of what is. The sphericity debate usually
polarizes around Fr. 8, 42 being a spatial/physical limit, so what is is spherical and the para-
doxes apply, or Fr. 8, 42 not being a spatial/physical limit and what is not being spherical.
Here I take the view that Fr. 8, 42 is a spatial/physical limit but what is is spherical, being
limited in other ways.
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analogues to this, if we were to ask a Platonist what limits the size of the cos-
mos, they might well cite the harmonic structure of the cosmos given at Ti-
maeus 35b ff. If we ask the same question of a Ptolemaic astronomer, they might
well answer that there is no unused space in the cosmos, we space the deferent
circles for the planets and stars on the principle that the epicycles may touch
but not overlap and that limits the size of the cosmos.67 Neither Plato, nor Aris-
totle nor Ptolemy countenance empty space beyond the cosmos.
There is an interesting move in Plato from the Republic and the Myth of Er,
where the cosmos is bound together externally by ὑποζώματα (which are ropes
used around the hull of a trireme to strengthen it) and the cosmos turns on a
pivot.68 The Timaeus 32 ff. though makes it quite clear that the universe ex-
hausts what is and is entirely complete, with no external binding or pivot to
rotate on. There is no doubt that the cosmos in the Timaeus is physically sphe-
rical, so it is also interesting that Plato, in what looks like an allusion to Parme-
nides Fr. 8, 42–45, says that the cosmos is:
λεῖον καὶ ὁμαλὸν πανταχῇ τε ἐκ μέσου ἴσον καὶ ὅλον καὶ τέλεον.
Smooth, uniform, equal in all ways from the centre, whole and complete.
Plato, Timaeus 34b
A second paradox can be expressed rather more bluntly: If the cosmos is sphe-
rical, what is outside it? The answer to that, for Parmenides, cannot be anything
that asserts the existence of non-being or implies that a void exists. As that
seems unavoidable, he cannot then have thought that what is is spherical.69 I
am not convinced that this line solves all the problems here though. As re-
marked earlier, Parmenides is talking quite generally about the whole and com-
plete nature of what is. If so, one would have to accept that there is a limit to
what is, as Parmenides clearly does. One might then ask: What is beyond/other
than/in addition to/outside of what is?70 Again, the answer ought not to be
‘there is nothing’. Instead, the answer might run like this. What is is complete.
What is exhausts what is and what we can speak of. That which does not exist

67 Technically, both these methods give ratios rather than absolute size, though both could
still be quite reasonably said to be limits on the size of the cosmos. Both can give absolute size
if the absolute distance between say earth and moon is known. Ptolemaic astronomers did
attempt this, Plato’s model was abandoned prior to the required techniques being devised.
68 Plato, Republic 616c.
69 One move to avoid this is to suggest that Parmenides had a closed vision of space rather
than the later (in modern terms Euclidean) view of infinitely extending space. However, I doubt
that Parmenides had a conception of space independent of his conception of what is.
70 If there is no limit to what is, I would still argue for a spherical cosmos for Parmenides.
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does not exist beyond what exists. The limits of what is are limits by exhaus-
tion, not external limits or edges bordering on something else. I do not want to
suggest that space is something independent for Parmenides,71 but one might
then say similarly that space is limited, it is limited by exhaustion and does not
have external limits and does not have edges bordering on something else.
What I do want to suggest is that for Parmenides, what is has spatial character-
istics such that it is reasonable to ascribe a shape to what is, such as a sphere.
Just as what is exhausts what is, those spatial characteristics exhaust the spa-
tial.72
If we understand limit for Parmenides as limit by exhaustion rather than as
external constraint or edge, then the alleged paradoxes are not generated. Par-
menides has an intelligent and original treatment of place and space. This
leaves us though with the question of why a sphere as opposed to some other
shape? Does this sphericity call upon sufficient reason considerations and not
just on the nature of being? The homogeneity of what is can be derived from
existence/non-existence considerations, but can the shape of what is be derived
in that manner as well? ‘Equivalent in all ways’ and ‘not any larger or smaller’
certainly look like sufficient reason considerations. If we do take this spatially
there are some interesting consequences for cosmology in terms of sufficient
reason and reactions to Parmenides in antiquity.

71 Nor is time something independent for Parmenides.
72 Does Parmenides then argue, as Melissus did (Melissus Fr. 7), that what is is motionless as
there is nowhere for it to move? No say G. S. Kirk and M. C. Stokes, Parmenides Refutation of
Motion, Phronesis 1960, pp. 1–4, Parmenides’ argument is ‘ontological not physical’, motion is
ruled out by the strictures against coming to be and passing away in general, not specifically
by a lack of further space. I agree the ‘ontological’ argument is quite general (as are the notions
of limit) but this does not preclude Parmenides adding in the physical argument as well. As
noted above, Fr. 8, 29–31 has more than is necessary just for the ontological argument and
‘ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει’, ‘remaining the
same and in the same, it lies in accordance with itself, thus it remains firmly in place’ might
indicate a physical argument. Plato’s attributes the physical argument to people like Melissus
and Parmenides in the Theaetetus180e., ‘ὡς ἕν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ οὐκ
ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖτα’, ‘Everything is one and stands still itself in itself having no space in
which to move.’
One might argue that just as Plato has made an extreme, unhistorical caricature of the
‘everything changes’ position in the preceding part of the Theaetetus, perhaps this is an unhis-
torical caricature as well. However, the preceding quotation of ‘οἷον ἀκίνητον τελέθει τῷ παντὶ
ὄνομ’ εἶναι’, quoted independently twice by Simplicius (Physics 29, 15 and 143, 8) and this close
parallel to Parmenides (Cf. Xenophanes Fr. 26, 1 as well) would seem to rule this out. See Corn-
ford (1935) on the quotation.
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VIII
There is a dilemma in both ancient and modern cosmogony which can be ex-
pressed like this. If the original state of the universe is homogeneous, and the
universe obeys laws which are place/direction invariant, it is then difficult to
see how anything interesting will develop in that universe. How would this ori-
ginal symmetry be broken? What sufficient reason would there be for it to be
broken in one place or direction rather than another? If the original state of the
universe is not homogeneous, we require some further explanation, some suffi-
cient reason as to why it has this particular state as opposed to any other. Mod-
ern big bang cosmogony has this problem. If we assume that what expands
from the initial state is entirely homogeneous, and that it expands isotropically
(equally in all directions), then all that will result will be a larger homogeneous
universe, which only differs from earlier stages in being less dense and cooler.73
The modern solution to this difficulty is to invoke quantum mechanics to break
the symmetry. At an early stage of the universe, quantum effects create inhomo-
geneities in the distribution of matter/energy throughout the universe (the fa-
mous ‘ripples’ in space/time). The areas of greater energy density will then act
as gravitational attractors, stars or galaxies will then form around these areas of
higher energy density. In reply to the question of why here rather than there,
the answer will be that quantum mechanics is fundamentally probabilistic in its
nature, and can only give probabilities of energy distribution.
If we take it that Parmenides argues that what exists is a homogenous
sphere, then he generates similar problems with cosmogony. As Mourelatos has
emphasised, a key aspect of the sphere analogy for Parmenides is the perfect
symmetrical nature of the sphere.74 How can that ever become anything like the
cosmos we see without breaking the symmetries and the principle of sufficient
reason? Again, I suggest that this is both a critique and a challenge. In particu-
lar I believe this is a critique of Anaximander, though it may well bite on the
other Milesians as well. Consider the initial stage for Anaximander when we
have nothing but the apeiron, before the process of separating out of opposites
and cosmos formation begins. Assuming we take this to be spatially and tempo-
rally unlimited and characterless, we then have an entirely homogenous entity.

73 It is very tempting to give a more dynamic sense to Parmenides by translating ‘μεσσόθεν
ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι’ (Fr. 8, 44) as ‘pushing out from the middle’ but given the strictures against
motion in the truth part of the poem that would be quite inappropriate. The cosmogonical puz-
zle works without this. Cf. Mourelatos (1970) p. 123, note 24. One possibility here is that, like a
ball, there is equal resistance to being squeezed in all directions.
74 Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 128.
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One might then ask what sufficient reason is there for when cosmos formation
begins and what sufficient reason is there for where cosmos formation begins?75
To these considerations we can add one outlined above, which is what would
we get from the characterless apeiron? Is there sufficient reason that we would
get e.g. hot and cold as opposed to any other pair? This goes rather beyond
Fränkel’s view of the relation between Parmenides and Anaximander.76 Fränkel
sees Parmenides as having a philosophical critique of Anaximander. Parme-
nides insists on limits where Anaximander posits the unlimited, being is com-
plete and finished for Parmenides where the apeiron is an arche from which the
cosmos is steered into existence. I am happy with those contrasts, but there is
an interesting sufficient reason critique of cosmogony as well.77
This critique may also bite on Thales and Anaximenes. In terms of matter
theory, Thales holds that everything can be generated from and destroyed into
water, Anaximenes that everything can be generated from and destroyed into
air. In terms of cosmogony, we might reasonably assume that the starting point
is homogenous water or homogenous air, transformations begin and a cosmos
is eventually formed.78 If so, we then have the same issues of where and when
cosmos formation will begin. Superficially, there may seem to be less of a pro-
blem about what we get first as transformations from water and air, rather than
the apeiron. Do we get water into earth or air first, do we get air being com-
pacted or rarified first? A deeper question from the earlier discussion would be
whether there is sufficient reason to attribute specific properties to water or air
and whether there is sufficient reason to suppose the scheme of transforma-
tions.

75 If Anaximander thought the apeiron to form a sphere, he might answer ‘the middle’. How-
ever, it is not clear that he did think the apeiron spherical, or that answering the ‘middle’ solves
the problem as the cosmos is not a point at the middle but is differentiated around the middle
and sufficient reason would need to be given for that differentiation.
76 H. Fränkel, Studies in Parmenides, in R. E. Allen and D. J. Furley, Studies in Presocratic
Philosophy, vol II. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, pp. 1–47, pp. 25 ff.
77 Especially, one might add, if Anaximander is himself committed to the principle of suffi-
cient reason, which his account of the stability of the earth might indicate, see Aristotle De
Caelo II/13 295b10ff., Hippolytus, Refutation of all Heresies I, 6, 3, though cf. Simplicius On the
Heavens 532.13.
78 If we assume otherwise, that there is a mix of water or air with other ‘elements’ or that
there are inhomogeneities, we fall into the other problem of what sufficient reason for this
particular distribution?
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IX
Parmenides’ views also stand as a challenge as well as a critique. Is it possible
to formulate a cosmogony that avoids the problems of giving sufficient reasons
for symmetry breaking if we assume a homogenous origin, or giving sufficient
reason for a supposed distribution if we assume a non-homogenous origin? If
there are some important sufficient reason considerations in Parmenides, that
may give us some interesting lines to pursue in relation to reactions to his work.
Within the confines of this paper I cannot pursue all of those, but I do want to
look briefly at Leucippus and Democritus on the issue of where and when cos-
moi begin to form. Even here I am conscious of passing over several issues of
what happens in the void for Leucippus and Democritus, which are the subject
of another paper, Leucippus and Democritus on Like to Like and ou mallon.79
Leucippus and Democritus make interesting use of the ou mallon principle. Lit-
erally ou mallon means ‘not rather than’ as in ‘not a rather than b’ and ex-
presses indifference or lack of preference between alternatives. If there is a mul-
tiplicity of atoms rather than a single entity, then there is an issue concerning
what are the sizes and shapes of these atoms. Simplicius tells us that Leucippus
believed there to be an infinite number of shapes and sizes for the atoms on an
ou mallon basis, that there are no preferred shapes or sizes.80 One can take that
either as a rejection or a reformulation of sufficient reason.81
There is no original state for Leucippus and Democritus as the atoms and
the void have existed for all time and that in itself is an interesting alternative
in relation to Parmenides. There is then no initial disposition of the atoms. How-
ever, they do hold that cosmoi come into existence. There is something more to
say here, especially as in the Simplicius passage the use of ou mallon can be
construed as a general principle. Plutarch tells us that for Democritus the distri-
bution of atoms in the void is ou mallon.82 Barnes’ paraphrase of Plutarch on

79 The key issue is whether there are any forces acting between the atoms or whether there
are just collisions prior to vortex formation.
80 Simplicius Physics 28, 8: ‘Leucippus supposed there to be an infinite number of atoms that
are always in motion and have an infinite number of shapes on the grounds that nothing is
such rather than such (διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον εἶναι).’ Cf. Aristotle Physics
III/4 203b25.
81 On this see Mourelatos (2005) Intrinsic and Relational Properties of Atoms in the Democri-
tean Ontology. In Metaphysics, Soul and Ethics in Ancient Thought, ed. R. Salles, Oxford: Claren-
don Press, p. 50.
82 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1109a, Democritus: ‘ἐν ᾗ διορίζεται μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δέν ἢ τὸ μη-
δέν εἶναι, δέν μὲν ὀνομάζων τὸ σῶμα μηδέν δὲ τὸ κενόν, ὡς καὶ τούτου φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστα-
σιν ἰδίαν ἔχοντος (Said that thing exists no more than nothing, ‘thing’ being the name of body
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Democritus is that ‘There is no more reason for there to be occupied than for
there to be unoccupied areas of space.’83 If that is so, then the distribution of
the atoms in the void is ou mallon as well, which would only to be expected if
there is no original disposition of atoms. If all we then have are collisions be-
tween atoms, then the formation of vortices which generate cosmoi will be ou
mallon with respect to time and place as well. Vortex formation in an infinite
void would occur at all times (but not in all places at all times) and in all places
(but not at all times in all places). This constitutes a very interesting, relevant
and consistent reply to Parmenides. Instead of requiring sufficient reason, Leu-
cippus and Democritus deploy the ou mallon principle, to the sizes and shapes
of atoms and to the distribution of atoms with the effect that the times and
places of vortex formation, and so cosmos formation, are ou mallon as well. I
will mention but not pursue here the idea that the Epicurean swerve also has
the effect of symmetry breaking, makes cosmos formation ou mallon with re-
spect to time and place and also moves away from the sufficient reason analysis
of Parmenides.
It is also notable that Plato in the Timaeus is careful to give sufficient rea-
son for every disposition of the cosmos that the demiurge makes. Of course,
there may be other motivations for Plato here as well. Against Anaxagoras, or at
least the Anaxagoras Plato depicts in the Phaedo, Plato may want to emphasise
the breadth and consistency of the teleological explanations he gives. Against
the atomists Plato wants to argue for a single well designed cosmos rather than
an indefinite number of cosmoi coming about by chance and notably he wants
two mathematically precise types of particle rather than the ou mallon attitude
of the atomists. Against Empedocles, he wants single, well designed species as
opposed to the nightmarish Empedoclean scenario of body parts moving around
and encountering each other by accident. We might also consider the Timaeus
as a reaction to Parmenides in giving sufficient reason for each disposition of
the cosmos.
X
Parmenides is sometimes held to have made some significant discoveries in as-
tronomy. There is a question of how that could be so, given the strictures of his

and ‘nothing’ of void, the latter having a nature and substance of its own.’ Cf. Aristotle Meta-
physics 985b4, Simplicius Physics, 28, 11–12.
83 Barnes (1982) p. 405.
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position as it is normally understood. Earlier I spoke of the importance of the
contrast between the σήματα at Fr. 8, 2 and at Fr. 8, 55 and Fr. 19, 3. Parmenides
refers to σήματα once more, in Fr. 10:
εἴσηι δ’ αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ’ ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα
σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο
λαμπάδος ἔργ’ ἀίδηλα καὶ ὁππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,
ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσηι περίφοιτα σελήνης
καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα
ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσα ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη
πείρατ’ ἔχειν ἄστρων.
You will know the nature of the aether and all
of the signs in the aether and the clean, pure lamp of the sun,
its destructive deeds and the manner of their generation.
You will learn the works and nature of the wandering round-eyed moon
you will know the surrounding heaven
whence it grew and how necessity led and bound it
to hold the limits of the stars.
Parmenides, Fr. 10.
As with the earlier contrast, there is nothing in the literature about how this use
of σήματα relates to the other uses. The σήματα here could have an astrological
sense (LSJ give sign from heaven, omen, portent as one group of meanings for
σήματα) though I would be more inclined simply to constellation, or perhaps
stars and planets.84 The deflationary view here is that Parmenides uses a fairly
standard word, σήματα, for constellations or perhaps portents in the heavens.
We can steer by the stars, so they are signs in that sense,85 tell time by the stars
and planets and orientate ourselves in that sense, or arrange our lives according
to the portents for signs and steering in a different sense, but there is nothing
philosophically significant here.
The alternative view is that σήματα is a highly loaded term for Parmenides
and its use here has considerable significance. Given that Parmenides chose to
write in poetic form and that commentators have considered, quite rightly, other
terms in Parmenides to be loaded this is certainly something that cannot be dis-
missed out of hand. The contrast between Parmenides’ uses of σήματα would
then look like this. Fr. 8, 1–4 gives us σήματα which exist independently on the
intellectual road. Fr. 8, 53–59 and Fr. 19, 3 then give us a sharp contrast with
σήματα which mortals set up themselves. Fr. 10, 1–2 gives us σήματα which are
in the physical, perceptual world. In contrast to Fr. 8, 1–4 these are not intellec-

84 Cf. Mourelatos (1970, 2008) p. 25 note 40.
85 Gallop (1984) p. 12–13.
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tual signs and in contrast to Fr. 8, 53–59 these signs have an independent exis-
tence, not being set up by humans.
Does this then mean that we can have some knowledge of the physical
world? Certainly there are verbs of knowing here, εἴσηι, πεύσηι and εἰδήσεις
and it is notable that like the verbs of knowing earlier in the poem,86 they are
all second person futures. The problem is that they range over several issues
(generation of the sun, growth of the heavens) where knowledge seemed ex-
pressly forbidden in the truth part of the poem. It is generally held then that we
should take the verbs of knowing here in the same sense as Fr. 1, 28 πυθέσθαι
and Fr. 8, 52 μάνθανε in that we learn what the opinions of mortals are but
understand that there is a problem with the veracity of those beliefs.87
However, one might question whether that does sufficient justice to Parme-
nides’ use of σήματα here, where the σήματα are independent and not set up by
humans as in Fr. 8, 55. One possibility here is that while these σήματα do not
help us with general cosmological theories, which remain underdetermined,
they may help us with specific astronomical phenomena. If so, that may help to
solve the puzzle of how Parmenides made some significant specific discoveries
in astronomy.
XI
There is evidence that Parmenides made some original and significant contribu-
tions to astronomy and cosmology. These are that the moon shines due to the
light of the sun, that the morning star and the evening star are the same entity
and that the earth is spherical, as well as being central and immobile. Graham
has recently reviewed the evidence and has made a convincing case that we
can attribute these discoveries to Parmenides.88
That Parmenides believed the moon to shine by light reflected by the sun is
beyond doubt as we have two fragments which say as much. Both fragments
are quoted by Plutarch who makes it clear that Parmenides is talking about the
moon in both cases:
νυκτὶ φάος περὶ γαῖαν ἀλώμενον ἀλλότριον φῶς.89

86 πυθέσθαι, Fr. 1, 28, μαθήσεαι Fr. 1, 31.
87 See. Eg. Gallop (1984) pp. 41 and 79.
88 Graham (forthcoming) Ch. 3, cf. Guthrie (1965) vol. II, p. 65.
89 Reading νυκτὶ φάος with A. Mourelatos, “The Light of Day by Night": nukti phaos, Said of
the Moon in Parmenides B14,” in Presocratics and Plato: Festschrift at Delphi in Honor of
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The light of day by night, roaming around earth with another’s light,
Parmenides Fr. 14.90
αἰεὶ παπταίνουσα πρὸς αὐγὰς ἠελίοιο.
Always looking toward the rays of the sun.
Parmenides Fr. 15.
Aetius tells us that:
Thales was the first to say it is illuminated by the sun. Pythagoras, Parmenides,
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus likewise.91
However, we have no evidence that Thales or Pythagoras said this or if they did
it had any effect. The attribution to Pythagoras also looks suspect in the light of
modern scholarship which understands Pythagoras largely as a religious figure
and recognises that many ideas were later wrongly attributed to him.92 That
leaves us with Parmenides as the first to recognise that the moon shone by light
from the sun. Diogenes Laertius says of Parmenides that:
He was the first to say the earth was spherical and situated in the middle.93
Given that Anaximander believed the earth to be drum shaped, and we have
little knowledge of other thinkers’ views, that is quite plausible, especially given
Parmenides’ emphasis on sufficient reason.94 Aetius also tells us that:
Parmenides placed the morning star first in the aether, which he believed is the same as
the evening star and after this the sun.95
Graham makes a good case that while the identity of the morning and evening
stars was well known to the Babylonians, this does not seem to have been re-

Charles Kahn, edd. Richard Patterson, Vassilis Karasmanis, and Arnold Hermann, Las Vegas,
NV, Parmenides Publishing, 2012, pp. 25–58, D. Graham (forthcoming) and MSS prior to Scali-
ger’s emendation to νυκτιφαÝς.
90 Cf. Aetius, Placita, II, 26, 2.
91 Aetius, Placita, II, 28, 5.
92 P. Tannery Pour l’histoire de la science hellène, 2nd edition. Paris: Gauthiers-Villars et Cie,
p. 219, cf. W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythgoreanism, Harvard U.P, 1972, C. Huff-
man, The Pythagorean Tradition, in A. A. Long Ed.(1999) The Cambridge Companion to Early
Greek Philosophy, Cambridge U.P., pp. 66–87, L. Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagor-
eans, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 2012.
93 Diogenes Laertius IX, 21.
94 In relation to the shape and position of the earth, Aetius Placita, III, 15, 7 tells us that: “For
Parmenides and Democritus, as it is equally distant from everything, it remains in a state of
equilibrium, having no reason why it should move this way rather than that.”
95 Aetius, Placita, II, 15, 7.
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cognised by the earlier presocratics and this may be an independent discovery
on Parmenides’ part. Graham also quite reasonably points out that in other
cases where the evidence is that a philosopher is the first to propound a theory,
we accept it as his own. Why should we not do so in Parmenides’ case?
I would add a parallel with treatment of Plato here. It used to be the case
that the natural philosophy of the Timaeus was attributed in whole to Pythagor-
ean sources, or that the astronomy of the Timaeus was attributed to Eudoxus.
With the demise of the strong two worlds interpretation of Plato and recent
work on the Timaeus and Plato’s attitude to natural philosophy in general we
recognise some Pythagorean influences but do not attribute the whole of the
Timaeus to the Pythagoreans. So too we can accept the astronomy as Plato’s
own on the basis that he recorded this astronomy first and there is no evidence
or reason to attribute it to anyone else. If we are re-assessing Parmenides’ atti-
tude to cosmology, we cannot dismiss evidence that he made important discov-
eries on the basis that one interpretation of his cosmology would rule out or
make implausible any significant discoveries on his part.96 Especially, one
might argue, when there are three perfectly plausible discoveries and the alter-
native to attributing them to Parmenides is the rather tired and vague strategy
of ‘it must have been one of the Pythagoreans’.
Is it then, as Guthrie put it in relation to the sphericity of the earth, though
his comment could apply to the identity of the morning star and evening star
and the fact that the moon reflects the light of the sun:
A strange freak of history that so fundamental a discovery should have been made by
one for whom the whole physical world was an unreal show.97
Perhaps we are better off rethinking whether for Parmenides ‘the whole physical
world was an unreal show’. If the comments above on σήματα are correct and
Fr. 10 has independently existing signposts in the heavens, we can see why
Parmenides’ discoveries were exclusively in astronomy. Owen once wrote that:
Parmenides did not write as a cosmologist. He wrote as a philosophical pioneer of the
first water.98
I simply reject this dichotomy.99 Were there philosophical pioneers of the first
water who were also interested in cosmology and had important things to say

96 Cf. Cerri (2011) p. 93.
97 Guthrie, p. 65, note 1.
98 Owen (1960) p. 68.
99 Cf. Sedley pp. 122–3.
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about cosmology? Do we really need to look further than Plato and Aristotle
here?100
XII
Let me return to the issues I raised in my introduction. Why did Parmenides
have a cosmology, why was it so long and why did it claim to give a complete
account? I have argued here that the opinion section gives us a critique of cos-
mology rather than doctrine. For that underdetermination critique to work, the
cosmology had to demonstrate that it could explain all of the phenomena itself
to be at least as good at accounting for the phenomena as all the preceding
cosmologies. Other cosmologies might at best equal it, but none could overtake
it. This account explains why the cosmology is simply presented and not argued
for. It frees us from attempting to explain the contents of the cosmology in
terms of preceding cosmologies in the manner of Zeller and Burnet. It frees us
from the idea that the cosmology is in some way a best possible or most likely
account when the philology is against such a reading of ἐοικότα and it is un-
clear how for Parmenides there could be a better cosmology, and if there can
be, why this particular cosmology is any better. It frees us from the idea that
this long cosmology explicates a single, immediately debilitating philosophical
error.
I have also argued that the cosmology, in conjunction with the truth part of
the poem, raises sufficient reason issues which are significant in themselves
and function as a critique of preceding cosmology and a challenge to future
cosmology. Can choices of the constituents for the cosmos and their attributes
be justified? Can the time and place of cosmogony be justified? Anaximander
may be a significant target for those questions, while in relation to the latter
question, Leucippus and Democritus have a very interesting answer.
How was it that Parmenides was able to make some significant discoveries
in astronomy? Here the contrast between Parmenides uses of σήματα is critical.
There are independent signs on the intellectual road, humans set up signs when
they attempt cosmology but there are also independent signs in the heavens.
While more general cosmological theories may be underdetermined, specific as-
tronomical theories may benefit from examination of these signs.

100 I note in relation to Plato that G. E. L. Owen ‘The Place of the Timaeus in Plato’s Dialo-
gues’, Classical Quarterly, 1953 pp. 79–95 gives a relatively minor role to the Timaeus in his
conception of Plato’s later development.
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How does the argument of the opinion part of the poem relate to the truth
part? Here I have offered no specific theory as the interpretation of the truth
part of the poem is still strongly contested by many different views. To argue for
a particular interpretation of the truth part of the poem would be the work of at
least another paper, if not a book. In this paper I have deliberately presented a
relatively traditional and conservative view of Parmenides’ poem. I have taken
esti in general to be existential,101 so the poem is largely about what is and I
have taken Parmenides to argue for a numerical monism.102 As the generally
received view, this gives us a basis to start to start thinking about the relation
of the two part of the poem. What I have tried to do here is offer a different way
of thinking about the truth of the poem and the idea that there are sufficient
reason issues concerning cosmogony and cosmology in the truth part. Some
points do emerge though from this study of Parmenides on cosmogony and cos-
mology in relation to thinking about the nature of the truth part of the poem
and its relation to the opinion part.
If there are sufficient reason considerations concerning cosmogony and cos-
mology in both parts of the poem, then those parts may not be so disparate in
their aim and function as some accounts have supposed. In particular, both
parts I have argued provide a critique of preceding cosmogony and cosmology
in their different ways, and a challenge for further thinking in these areas.
Commentators sometimes ask a version of this question: Did Parmenides
realise the full consequences of what he argued for?103 In relation to cosmology
and cosmogony, I would say yes he does, very much so. The term diacosmos
seems brilliantly chosen to make us think about the nature of cosmogony and
cosmology, especially in relation to the use of κόσμος at Fr. 8, 52 (the deceptive
κόσμος of the goddesses words) and at Fr. 4, 3 (what is cannot be dispersed or
gathered together to form a κόσμος).104 Fr. 10 and Fr. 19 also seem to refer back,
in a self-conscious manner, to Fr.8 9–10 (why now for cosmogony) and to is-
sues of change and growth more generally.
Following on from these points, Parmenides is very careful in his choice of
words and resonances in relation to cosmogony and cosmology. This should be
no great surprise given that Parmenides chose poetry to express himself and

101 As opposed to reading esti as veridical (is true) or as a copula (is X). See Gallop (1984) p. 7
for a survey here.
102 As opposed to the predicational nomism of Curd (2004) or the generous monism of Palmer
(2009).
103 For contrasting answers, see Guthrie (1965) p. 52 and M. M. Mackenzie Parmenides’ Dilem-
ma, Phronesis 1982, pp. 1–12.
104 I have also argued that Parmenides was aware of issues related to arguing for a spherical
entity.
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after the seminal work of Mourelatos.105 It does have some important implica-
tions though. If Parmenides is careful about his use of words, what of his use of
the term σήματα at Fr. 8, 2 and at Fr. 8, 55, Fr. 10, 2 and ἐπίσημον at Fr. 19, 3?
There are some very interesting contrasts here (independent signs on the route,
signs set up by humans, independent signs in the heavens) and if we accept
that Parmenides chooses his words carefully, it is harder to run a deflationary
line about Fr. 10, 2 and the signs in the heavens.
In relation to the truth part of the poem, at Fr. 8, 53–4 where Parmenides
talks of the number of forms mortals introduce, I would question the assump-
tion that Parmenides has a position on which he is unintentionally ambiguous.
It is at least a possibility, that in a crucial passage written by someone who
chooses his expressions carefully, that he is deliberately ambiguous and throws
the onus on the reader to think about the issue.106
Parmenides then had much of interest to say about the nature of cosmog-
ony and cosmology, both as critique and challenge, if we recognise the suffi-
cient reason questions he raises and the key contrasts between the different
types of σήματα.

105 Mourelatos (1970, 2008).
106 Especially as this comes directly after the warning to be aware of the deceptive cosmos of
words to follow.
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